The 2005 Base Realignment And Closure
(BRAC) commission was intended to trim excess domestic base infrastructure, which is
estimated at 25% too large and costs billions of dollars a year. In addition,
heightened base security has become a tremendous financial drain, and older buildings
constructed during the Cold war have decayed and need replacement.
The four
previous base closure rounds now save our military $6.6 billion dollars each
year. Read this GAO report (pdf) for more information. Nevertheless, there
has been a
movement to derail the 2005 round of base closures by convincing people it is
cheaper to keep all bases open and lease land to earn money; thus expanding what
is known as Government Owned Contractor Operated (GOCO) facilities. This robs
local communities of business property taxes and rarely produces net profits as
cozy relationships result in contracts in which the government still pays for
property maintenance.
When Did BRAC 2005 Start and How Did
it Work?
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The 2005 round will began in March 2005 when the President, in consultation
with congressional leaders, appointed a nine-member base closing
commission.
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Two months later, the defense secretary submitted his list of facilities
to be closed.
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BRAC required seven members to add a facility to that list, but just a simple
majority to remove a facility.
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The President could approve that list and send it to Congress, or reject it
and send it back to the commission.
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Neither Congress nor the President were allowed to make changes to the list.
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When the President accepted the list, it became law, since Congress did not vote against it
within 45 days. Congress has never voted against the President's list since Congressmen from districts
spared closures always deem the list to be fair.
Small Bases are Felt to be
Inefficient and Vulnerable
Small military
bases are inefficient to operate since each base usually has a housing office,
equal opportunity office, public affairs, chapel, library, auto shop, medical
clinic, dental clinic, commissary, exchange, base headquarters, base security,
decal office, fitness center, reception center, swimming pool, child care
center, enlisted club, officer club, teen club, family support center, temporary
lodging, education center, dining hall, maintenance office, golf course,
theater, post office, and various recreational facilities. Therefore, shifting
"tenant" units to larger bases with room for growth saves a great deal of money
and manpower in the long run, although moving units requires money for
relocation and some new construction. Reserve, National Guard, and federal
civilian activities at closed bases can continue as they do elsewhere without a
military landlord.
BRAC Helped Armed Services
Eliminate Outdated Organizations
Base closures also
allow the elimination of outdated organizations which have been preserved as
jobs programs by members of Congress. The armed services must realize they can
eliminate these organizations by pulling the rug out from them by closing their
base. They should identify these bases now so they can limit closing costs by
quietly implementing a hiring and construction/renovation freeze at targeted
bases a couple years early. Ironically, most communities benefit from base
closures as property tax free and sales tax free military units are replaced by
productive tax-paying private sector companies.
Note:
As this table shows, Department of Defense give priority to military value (criteria 1-4)
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MILITARY VALUE |
OTHER CONSIDERATIONS |
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1. The current and future mission capabilities and the impact
on operational readiness of the Department of Defense's total force,
including the impact on joint warfighting, training, and readiness. |
5. The extent and timing of potential costs and
savings, including the number of years, beginning with the date of
completion of the closure or realignment, for the savings to exceed
the costs.
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2. The availability and condition of land, facilities and
associated airspace (including training areas suitable for maneuver
by ground, naval, or air forces throughout a diversity of climate
and terrain areas and staging areas for the use of the Armed Forces
in homeland defense missions) at both existing and potential
receiving locations.
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6. The economic impact on existing communities
in the vicinity of military installations.
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3. The ability to accommodate contingency, mobilization, and
future total force requirements at both existing and potential
receiving locations to support operations and training.
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7. The ability of both the existing and
potential receiving communities' infrastructure to support forces,
missions, and personnel.
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4. The cost of operations and the manpower implications.
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8. The environmental impact, including the impact of
costs related to potential environmental restoration, waste
management, and environmental compliance activities. |
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