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Base Realignment & Closure (BRAC) 2005

 

Why BRAC?

The 2005 Base Realignment And Closure (BRAC) commission was intended to  trim excess domestic base infrastructure, which is estimated at 25% too large and costs billions of dollars a year. In addition, heightened base security has become a tremendous financial drain, and older buildings constructed during the Cold war have decayed and need replacement.

 

The four previous base closure rounds now save our military $6.6 billion dollars each year. Read this GAO report (pdf) for more information. Nevertheless, there has been a movement to derail the 2005 round of base closures by convincing people it is cheaper to keep all bases open and lease land to earn money; thus expanding what is known as Government Owned Contractor Operated (GOCO) facilities. This robs local communities of business property taxes and rarely produces net profits as cozy relationships result in contracts in which the government still pays for property maintenance.

When Did BRAC 2005 Start and How Did it Work?

  • The 2005 round will began in March 2005 when the President, in consultation with congressional leaders, appointed a nine-member base closing commission.

  • Two months later, the defense secretary submitted his list of facilities to be closed.

  • BRAC required seven members to add a facility to that list, but just a simple majority to remove a facility.

  • The President could approve that list and send it to Congress, or reject it and send it back to the commission.

  • Neither Congress nor the President were allowed to make changes to the list.

  • When the President accepted the list, it became law, since Congress did not vote against it within 45 days. Congress has never voted against the President's list since Congressmen from districts spared closures always deem the list to be fair.

Small Bases are Felt to be Inefficient and Vulnerable

Small military bases are inefficient to operate since each base usually has a housing office, equal opportunity office, public affairs, chapel, library, auto shop, medical clinic, dental clinic, commissary, exchange, base headquarters, base security, decal office, fitness center, reception center, swimming pool, child care center, enlisted club, officer club, teen club, family support center, temporary lodging, education center, dining hall, maintenance office, golf course, theater, post office, and various recreational facilities. Therefore, shifting "tenant" units to larger bases with room for growth saves a great deal of money and manpower in the long run, although moving units requires money for relocation and some new construction. Reserve, National Guard, and federal civilian activities at closed bases can continue as they do elsewhere without a military landlord.

BRAC Helped Armed Services Eliminate Outdated Organizations

Base closures also allow the elimination of outdated organizations which have been preserved as jobs programs by members of Congress. The armed services must realize they can eliminate these organizations by pulling the rug out from them by closing their base. They should identify these bases now so they can limit closing costs by quietly implementing a hiring and construction/renovation freeze at targeted bases a couple years early. Ironically, most communities benefit from base closures as property tax free and sales tax free military units are replaced by productive tax-paying private sector companies.

 


 

 

Draft Selection Criteria

 Note: As this table shows, Department of Defense give priority to military value (criteria 1-4)

MILITARY VALUE

OTHER CONSIDERATIONS

1. The current and future mission capabilities and the impact on operational readiness of the Department of Defense's total force, including the impact on joint warfighting, training, and readiness.

5. The extent and timing of potential costs and savings, including the number of years, beginning with the date of completion of the closure or realignment, for the savings to exceed the costs.

 

2. The availability and condition of land, facilities and associated airspace (including training areas suitable for maneuver by ground, naval, or air forces throughout a diversity of climate and terrain areas and staging areas for the use of the Armed Forces in homeland defense missions) at both existing and potential receiving locations.

 

6. The economic impact on existing communities in the vicinity of military installations.

 

3. The ability to accommodate contingency, mobilization, and future total force requirements at both existing and potential receiving locations to support operations and training.

 

7. The ability of both the existing and potential receiving communities' infrastructure to support forces, missions, and personnel.

 

4. The cost of operations and the manpower implications.

 

8. The environmental impact, including the impact of costs related to potential environmental restoration, waste management, and environmental compliance activities.

 

 

 

Copyright © 2006, Edwards Community Alliance